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Abstract 
 
 
In the previous paper, Bill Seeley suggests that what follows from research into crossmodal perception for 
expression and emotion in the arts is that there is an emotional contour (i.e., a contour constitutive of the 
content of an emotion and potentially realizable across a range of media). As a response of sorts, I speculate as 
to what this might hold for philosophical and empirical enquiry into expression and emotion across the arts as 
well as into the nature of the emotions themselves. 
 
 
Bill Seeley’s paper in this volume (“Hearing How Smooth It Looks: Selective Attention and 
Crossmodal Perception in the Arts”) is much like any other paper by Bill Seeley in that not 
only is it exceptionally well-informed philosophically, scientifically, and art-historically, 
but (and perhaps most frustrating of all) the principal claims and conclusions reached 
therein are all measured, responsible, and prima facie plausible. As such, I think it far more 
productive here not to respond to Seeley’s project but instead to make on his behalf 
precisely those immodest and speculative sorts of forays conspicuously absent from his 
work. 
 
Towards the end of his paper, Seeley suggests that what follows from research into 
crossmodal perception for expression and emotion in the arts is that, 
 
…there is an abstract dynamic quality, a contour, which is generally constitutive of 
the content of an emotion and can potentially be realized in any of a range of media 
with adequate structure and temporal flexibility. 
 
For argument’s sake, let’s grant the above, and for simplicity’s sake, let’s call a contour that 
is constitutive of the content of an emotion an emotional contour. In what follows, I suggest 
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Corresponding Author: Christy Mag Uidhir 
University of Houston 
email – cmaguidhir@gmail.com 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:2                                                                                                        Mag Uidhir | 519 
 
 
 
 
what must surely be the principal questions pursuant the above then speculate as to some of 
the general implications certain of our answers to such questions might hold for 
philosophical and empirical enquiry into expression and emotion across the arts as well as 
into the nature of the emotions themselves. 
 
Assuming there are such emotional contours and structurally adequate media within which 
they can potentially be realized, the extent to which their employ within relevant areas of 
enquiry can be productive or explanatorily significant depends largely upon how we answer 
the following: 
 
1) Do all or only some emotions have emotional contours? How might some emotions 
be better suited than others for possessing emotional contours? 
2) Can all or only some emotional contours be potentially realized in any structurally 
adequate media? How might some emotional contours be better suited than others 
with respect to their realization either within the same structurally adequate medium 
or across the range of any and all such media? 
3) Are all or only some art-relevant media structurally adequate with respect to the 
potential realization of emotional contours? How might some art-relevant media be 
better suited than others to realize either the same emotional contour or the range of 
any and all such contours? 
 
Presumably, the most obvious starting point from which to begin to answer such questions 
is theory of the emotions — after all, in order to better understand emotional contours, we 
presumably must first better understand that to which such contours are generally 
constitutive. 
 
For example, we might think how we ought to answer the first question depends upon what 
we take to be the individuating conditions for the emotions. That is, perhaps we should 
expect only those emotions standardly thought (in garden-variety cases) to be individuated 
via their phenomenal character to give rise to some emotional contour potentially realizable 
in some structurally adequate medium, and thereby expect such emotional contours to be 
largely absent for those emotions standardly thought (in garden-variety cases) to have 
largely non-phenomenal individuation conditions (e.g., formal or intentional objects, 
cognition, propositional attitudes, action tendencies, neurological processes, behavior or 
dispositional effects). Moreover, perhaps we should think relevant distinctions between 
individuation conditions for the emotions track some art-relevant distinction within the 
range of (art-relevant) structurally adequate media. In so doing, not only might we carve the 
art-relevant domain of emotional contours into more informative subcategories such as the 
musical emotions, literary emotions, narrative emotions, cinematic emotions, plastic 
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emotions, and so forth, but we also might take such distinctions to map onto those made at 
the level of individuation conditions. 
 
This suggests, for example, that perhaps the musical emotions — i.e., emotional contours 
realized in musical media — most likely are those individuated largely via phenomenal 
character, while the narrative emotions — i.e., emotional contours realized in narrative 
media — 1 most likely are those otherwise individuated non-phenomenally (e.g., 
propositional attitudes, intentional objects, and so forth).2 Given this, we would intuitively 
expect certain media (e.g., any purely musical medium) to be better (or best) suited for 
realizing the emotional contours of the more garden-variety emotions for which phenomenal 
character stands as the commonsense method of individuation (e.g., anger, sadness) and 
certain others (e.g., literary media) to stand better (or best) suited to realizing the emotional 
contours of those emotions for which phenomenal character looks less productive an 
individuation method (e.g., guilt, shame, and jealousy). Of course, the extent to which 
expression and emotion in the arts foundationally concerns phenomenal character of the 
emotions may well depend upon the extent to which the feeling theory of the emotions (e.g., 
Damasio 1999) wins out over its competitors, be they doxastic (e.g., Solomon 1976), 
cognitivist (e.g., Nussbaum 2001), or perception-based (e.g., Prinz 2004). Regardless, for 
any account of emotional contours and their corresponding media structurally adequate for 
their realizations to be even prima facie viable, it must be predicated upon (or at least 
consistent with) some minimally viable theory of the emotions. That said, perhaps we could 
make a prima facie plausible case that any minimally viable theory of the emotions must 
allow for emotional contours and the potential realizations thereof within various media 
across the arts. 
 
Whether or not Seeley himself would assent to such speculation, his view nevertheless 
provides the ground upon which our so speculating can turn out to be productive and 
informative.  
 
 
References 
 
Antonio Damasio. 1999. The Feeling of what Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
 
Christy Mag Uidhir. 2011a. “The Paradox of Suspense Realism,” Journal of Aesthetics & 
Art Criticism 69(2): 161-171. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6245.2011.01458.x 
 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:2                                                                                                        Mag Uidhir | 521 
 
 
 
Christy Mag Uidhir. 2011b. “An Eliminativist Theory of Suspense,” Philosophy & 
Literature 35(1): 121-133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.2011.0000 
 
Martha Nussbaum. 2011. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Jesse Prinz. 2004. Gut Reactions: a Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Robert Solomon. 1976. The Passions. New York: Doubleday. 
                                                         
1 For example, one might think suspense paradigmatically a narrative emotion and as such incoherent 
when taken as either a musical emotion or plastic emotion. For the view that suspense is not an 
emotion, see (Mag Uidhir 2011a, 2011b) 
 
